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Leon Liao's avatar

From the perspective of national competition, I agree with Devansh’s central point: AI competition is rapidly moving beyond the old framework of intra-software industry rivalry and increasingly starting to look like a composite contest of state capacity, industrial systems, energy systems, and financial power. The core bottleneck in AI by 2026 is no longer simply whether a country has access to enough GPUs. It is whether it can run massive numbers of intelligent agents cheaply, reliably, compliantly, and at scale. And what truly constrains that expansion is often not the chip itself, but grid access, data center construction, cooling, financing, and the friction of enterprise deployment. In that sense, the most important dividing line in U.S.-China competition is whether a country possesses the conditions necessary to convert laboratory capability into economy-wide deployment.

America’s strengths have long been concentrated in frontier models, top-tier talent, software ecosystems, capital markets, and global platforms. China’s potential advantages, by contrast, are increasingly showing up in stronger power-system expansion, more complete manufacturing supply chains, faster infrastructure buildout, and higher state coordination capacity. The United States is using its superior ability to mobilize capital to offset its infrastructure weaknesses. That is a classic American strength, but also a classic American risk. The U.S. excels at securitizing future expectations, leveraging them, and capitalizing them early, which is why it often moves extraordinarily fast in the early stages of a new industrial wave. But if physical infrastructure and real-world deployment fail to keep pace, then financial front-loading can transform what should have been a medium- to long-term industrial construction challenge into an asset-liability problem much earlier than expected.

At the same time, the United States should not be underestimated. America’s real advantage is not simply that it can raise money. It is that it can connect research, entrepreneurship, venture capital, public-market exits, global customers, platform ecosystems, and legal institutions into a highly efficient innovation amplifier. Even with aging local grids and fragmented permitting, the United States may still gradually rebuild parts of a new AI infrastructure system through market-based power purchase agreements, privately developed energy assets, hyperscaler vertical integration, and regulatory adaptation. Historically, the U.S. has repeatedly demonstrated a remarkable ability to generate new financing tools, new infrastructure models, and new industrial alliances under pressure. In many cases, it is precisely through bubbles, overfinancing, and seemingly wasteful competition that America ends up selecting the true infrastructure winners of the next cycle. Its system is often messy, expensive, and inefficient, yet it is also capable of producing new forms of industrial dominance out of that very chaos.

In my view, AI industry competition should really be understood as the combination of seven interlocking layers: energy, chips, cloud, models, open-source ecosystems, enterprise software entry points, and real-world deployment scenarios. China is stronger in energy, infrastructure speed, manufacturing depth, and some application environments. The United States remains stronger in advanced chips, the global software ecosystem, cloud platforms, capital markets, and original technology networks. What will ultimately determine the outcome is not which side is stronger at any single node, but which side can combine these capabilities into a sustainable closed loop.

That is why the future is more likely to produce layered leadership than unilateral dominance. Once AI becomes sufficiently cheap and sufficiently widespread, the decisive question will no longer be who built the smartest model in the lab. It will be who has the stronger industrial organizational capacity to absorb, deploy, power, finance, regulate, and embed intelligence into the broader economy.

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